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 1 
The Future of EU Differentiated Integration: The Tax Microcosm 
Maria Kendrick1 
 
Abstract 
The EU’s path of integration sees it adopt harmonising agendas in many areas of EU law. As 
they touch on areas of Member State sovereignty, these agendas are proving difficult to 
achieve, either without significant reform, or at all. As a consequence, the future development 
of EU law in the direction of continued integration is not certain. Differentiated integration 
may be the viable alternative. The research question this article therefore seeks to answer is: 
how far should harmonisation go in the EU? In answering this question, the adoption of a case 
study methodology allows for generalising from a specific example to the wider EU trajectory. 
Tax embodies the tensions between Member State sovereignty and EU law harmonising 
agendas, and in the context of the imperative to harmonise caused by the digitalisation of the 
economy, it is a microcosm. The tax microcosm demonstrates that there are limits to how far 
harmonisation can go in the EU, and that the future will likely see more differentiated 
integration. 
 
Key words: Digital Tax, Digital Services Tax, Tax Harmonisation, EU Integration, 
Differentiated Integration 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“The ultimate – be it manifest, implicit, hidden or unsaid – goal of the European Union is to 
achieve full supranational integration, and law, policy and politics should bring us there”.2 This 
statement was made by Pistone in the context of advocating an increase in positive tax 
integration at the supranational level. The suggestion here is that law, being a manifestation of 
politics and policy, is to be used for the instrumental purpose of integration. Van Gestel and 
Micklitz identify an inference that as this occurs with law, so it also occurs with legal 
scholarship, consequently resulting in a pro-integration perspective adopted by legal research, 
“… an increased instrumentalisation of European law and legal research has … resulted in a 
lack of scholarly criticism towards European integration.”3 Advising caution against ‘herd 
behaviour’, they argue that “as far as some of the most important developments with respect to 
European integration are concerned, many legal scholars are not asking the right questions 
simply because they focus too much on EU lawmakers who see European integration as an 
ongoing process with no horizon and few constitutional limits.”4 In essence, this caution 
involves identifying law as being used as an instrument to achieve certain integrative ends, be 
they social, political and/or economic, and suggesting that legal scholarship can be caught up 
in this momentum, rather than operating independently to act as a check on the direction in 
which EU law is developing.5 
 
1 Dr Maria Kendrick, The City Law School at City, University of London, Northampton Square, London, 
EC1V0HB. Maria.kendrick@city.ac.uk. She is on the Editorial Board of the Global Trade and Customs Journal 
and Kluwer Law International's Regulating for Globalization Blog. Her research areas cover: EU Law, 
including EU integration, differentiated integration and tax; UK Public Law; and Human Rights. Her research 
interests therefore naturally cover the subject of Brexit.  
2 P. Pistone, ‘European Tax Integration: The Need for a Traffic Light at the Crossroads of Law, Policy and 
Politics’, in P. Pistone (ed) European Tax Integration: Law, Policy and Politics, IBFD September 2018 xxxvii. 
3 U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen, and L. Roseberry (eds), European Legal Method – Paradoxes and Revitalisation, 
DJOF Publishing (Copenhagen 2011) p9. 
4 U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen, and L. Roseberry (n3) p9. 
5 R. van Gestel and H-W. Micklitz, ‘Revitalising Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What about 
Methodology?’ in U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen, and L. Roseberry (n3), p55. 
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The instrumentalisation of scholarship is not, however, a new phenomenon in Europe. The 
Enlightenment thinkers had been influenced by the philosophers who came before them, and 
similarly has the Enlightenment influenced the legal and philosophical scholastic thinking 
which followed.6 Developing out of an apostatical shift towards the age of reason and 
rationality,7 Kant’s vision of the achievement of a single cosmopolitan state as a form of civic 
union8 has in turn influenced Habermas in his propoundment of a “new narrative from the 
perspective of a constitutionalisation of international law that follows Kant in pointing far 
beyond the status quo to a future cosmopolitan rule of law: the European Union can be 
understood as an important step on the path towards a politically constituted world society.”9 
Producing ideas of Idealism and Liberalism which envision the EU as a peacemaker10 with a 
distinct role for law in this integrative process,11 these ideas have promulgated thinking about 
legal methods in light of broader social and humanistic science approaches.12  
 
Although some of these legal theories prominent in Europe, such as natural law, legal 
positivism and legal realism13 pre-date the EU’s existence, arguably this instrumentalisation 
has not stopped, with some schools developing subsequently and alongside the EU, such as 
New Legal Realism and New Formalism, for example.14 The EU’s creation and conception has 
therefore been influenced by, and has influenced, these theories.15 As the EU project is one 
generally recognised as aiming at a steady process of integration through the creation of a ‘new 
legal order’16 leading to an ‘ever closer union’,17 its aim is to achieve a uniform application of 
EU law. The concept of legal uniformity is defined by Grosswald Curran18 as the homogenised 
application of law, which is considered, in light of Berman’s analysis19 to be used for the 
achievement of a ‘new world order’20 above the level, but presupposing the existence, of the 
nation State. We can see the influence of the Kantian and Habermas theories here. Within the 
 
6 See, amongst many publications on this subject, M. Trapp, ‘Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment’ 
(Ashgate 2007). 
7 K. Swanson, ‘Apostate: the men who Destroyed the Christian West’, (Generations with Vision, USA 2013). 
8 ‘Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbyrgerlicher Absicht’ English translation: ‘Idea for a Universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View’ in Lewis White Beck (ed) Kant On History (New York, Bobbs-
Menill 1963) and P. J. Rossi, ‘Globalization and Cosmopolitanism: Tracing a Kantian Trajectory to Peace’, in I. 
Malek, S. Shastri and Y. Shastri, (eds) ‘Quest of Peace: Indian Culture Shows the Path’, Eds. (Delhi, India, 
Bharatiya Kala Prakashan 2006) pp162-174. 
9 Habermas, ‘The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalisation of International Law’ 
(2012) The European Journal of International Law 23:2, 335-348. See also for further examples of Habermas’ 
thinking on this issue, ‘A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society’, in Habermas, ‘Between 
Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays’ (Polity 2008). 
10 See K. K. Patel, ‘Project Europe: A History’, (Cambridge University Press 2020) and B. Heuser, ‘Brexit in 
History: Sovereignty or a European Union?’ (Hurst & Company, London 2019). 
11 The promotion of the rule of law has become the foundation of the ‘new world order’ according to Louchlin: 
M. Loughlin, ‘The Apotheosis of the Rule of Law’ The Political Quarterly 89:4 Oct – Dec 2018, 659-666. 
12 U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen, and L. Roseberry (n3), p21. 
13 R. van Gestel and H-W. Micklitz, (n5) p30. 
14 See V. Nourse and G. Schaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New 
Legal Theory?’ 95 (2009) Cornell Law Review 61-137 and H. Dagan and R. Kreitner ‘The New Legal Realism 
and the Realist View of Law’ 43 (2) Law and Social Inquiry (2018) 528-553. 
15 U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen, and L. Roseberry (n3), p8. 
16 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, para 3. 
17 Article 1 TEU. 
18 V. Grosswald Curran, ‘Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the 
Homogenization of the European Union’ (2001) 7 / 63 Colum. J. Eur. L. 111. 
19 N. Berman, ‘But the Alternative Is despair: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of 
International Law’ (1993) 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1792. 
20 Ibid 1794. 
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Union, this concept usually, and paradigmatically, refers to the uniform application of Union 
law enacted through unanimous voting, which achieves agreement by all Member States across 
all policy areas. It is uniformity that is said to be the goal. The epithets of uniformity are 
harmonisation, convergence and approximation, which in essence mean the same thing: the 
eradication of difference and the replacement with a single set of rules, principles, practices 
etc. Fahey suggests that “there are many terms which are synonyms for convergence and it 
becomes a vast literature of sub-disciplines to seek out commonly used narratives or terms for 
convergence, harmonisation and unification are two such examples …”.21  
 
Supranational legislative harmonisation intends to impact upon the differences between the 
Member States, and therefore the sovereignty of those Member States to legislate in their own 
territories. Raz, defines sovereignty as comprising a ‘double immunity’,22 which he describes 
thus, “[a]n authority is sovereign if both internal authorities and external authorities 
acknowledge that they do not have the power to rescind or modify its decisions and rulings”23 
and therefore the State can escape the imposition of ‘uniformities’.24 The desire to maintain 
State sovereignty creates tensions with the apparently contrary desire for harmonisation in the 
EU. This can raise questions as to the future direction of the development of EU law.  
 
In this context, Van Gestel and Micklitz question the assumptions which discourage legal 
scholars, in particular, from taking a critical perspective towards EU integration, “why are there 
so many implicit assumptions in scholarly legal publications, such as: harmonization of law is 
good and legal diversity is bad”?25 This article intends to take a step back from this assumption 
and try to answer the research question: how far should harmonisation go in the EU? It will 
suggest that the answer is that there is a limit to EU harmonisation. This limit is identified in 
the EU’s own difficulties in achieving legislative harmonisation. The answer for the future 
development of EU law, this article will suggest, is differentiated integration. This concept 
suggests that rigid adherence to uniformity is not necessary. Whilst there are many definitions, 
in essence, as Ott suggests, it is a “model of integration strategies that try to reconcile 
heterogeneity within the European Union and allow different groupings of Member States to 
pursue an array of public policies with different procedural and institutional arrangements”.26 
The advantage of differentiated integration, is that it provides a means to consider integration 
from an alternative perspective.  
 
In exploring the future of EU differentiated integration, this article adopts a research design 
comprising an innovative dual methodology, deployed rigorously to try to answer the research 
question. It includes consideration of historical attempts at legislative harmonisation and the 
 
21 E. Fahey, Introduction in E. Fahey (ed), ‘Framing Convergence with the Global Legal Order: The EU and the 
World’ (Hart Publishing 2020) p8. 
22 J. Raz, ‘The Future of State Sovereignty’ (2017) King’s College London Law School Research Paper 2017-
42, Columbia Public Law Research Paper 14-574, and Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 61/2017, 21 
November 2017, revised 1 February 2018, 7. 
23 Ibid 15. 
24 Ibid 15. 
25 R. van Gestel and H-W. Micklitz, (n5) p35. 
26 A. Ott, ‘EU Constitutional Boundaries to Differentiation: How to Reconcile Differentiation with Integration?’ 
in A. Ott and E. Vos (eds), Fifty Years of European Integration: Foundations and Perspectives (T.M.C. Asser 
Press 2009) 113. See also, amongst others, R. Adler-Nissen, Opting Out of the European Union: Diplomacy, 
Sovereignty and European Integration (CUP 2014) 2, referring to A. Kölliker Flexibility and European 
Unification: The Logic of Differentiated Integration (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield 2006). 
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need to resort to differentiated integration. History is important,27 because as this issue’s 
introduction states, “[m]ost significant interventions in the field of EU law have predominantly 
always been backwards looking and historical, given the nature of integration - perpetually in 
want of a narrative to explain and expound its significance”. Collingwood,28 in advancing his 
principles of historical methodology, propounded that copy and paste history is not accurate 
history, but rather advocated referring to original sources.29 This article therefore utilises 
sources, such as draft legislative proposals, Commission policy documents and impact 
assessments to answer the research question.  
 
History is only one element of the research design, as the intention of this article is not just to 
produce an historical narrative, but a past, present and future narrative. To learn lessons from 
the past and provide that future narrative, this article will draw on Yin’s exposition of the case 
study methodology,30 which provides the lens through which to consider the issues of 
integration, harmonisation and differentiated integration occurring in one area of EU law, and 
from which lessons can be learnt and applied to other areas, via the process of analytic 
generalisation. Yin describes this as “the logic whereby case study findings can extend to 
situations outside the original case study, based on the relevance of similar theoretical concepts 
or principles”.31 This will assist in future-mapping the development of EU law in one, and 
consequently other, areas of EU law.  
 
As sovereignty asks which legal order should actually be supreme; the national or the 
supranational, it implies issues of territoriality as the “boundary line is the line of 
sovereignty”.32 The paradigmatic quality of a sovereign body is the power to tax,33 because it 
is inextricably linked with the power to govern. Tax encapsulates this issue and is therefore a 
microcosm. The EU has a tax harmonisation agenda34 precipitated by digitalisation of the 
economy,35 but experiences reluctance from Member States to adopt it, or aspects of it. In 
taxation, it is therefore possible to map shifts in law-making and competence. The Commission 
and the EU have tried to utilise differentiated integration, such as enhanced cooperation36 for 
the financial transaction tax,37 transition periods for the Interest and Royalties Directive,38 
 
27 On the importance of the historical perspective see K. K. Patel, ‘Project Europe: A History’, (Cambridge 
University Press 2020) and B. Heuser, ‘Brexit in History: Sovereignty or a European Union?’ (Hurst & 
Company, London 2019). 
28 R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (first published 1938, OUP 1964). 
29 Ibid 62. 
30 R. K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Cosmos Corporation, 5th edn, SAGE Publications 
2014). 
31 Ibid, 237. 
32 J. H. Beale, ‘Jurisdiction to tax’ (1919) 32 Harvard Law Review 587, 587-8. 
33 Ibid 588. 
34 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A Fair and 
Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single Market’ COM (2017) 547 final. 
35 See W. Haslehner, G. Kofler, K. Pantazatou and A. Rust (eds), ‘Tax and the Digital Economy: Challenges 
and Proposals for Reform’ Series on International Taxation, No. 69, (Kluwer Law International 2019). 
36 Articles 20 TEU and 326 to 334 TFEU. 
37 Council Decision 2013/52/EU authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax [2013] 
OJ L 22/11. 
38 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and 
royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States [2003] OJ L 157/49 and A. 
Cedelle, ‘Enhanced Cooperation: A Way Forward for Tax Harmonisation in the EU?’ Oxford University Centre 
for Business Taxation, October 2015, WP 15/33 reprinted from J. Englisch (ed), ‘International Tax Law: New 
Challenges to and from Constitutional and legal Pluralism’ (IBFD 2016) chapter 6. 
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minimum harmonisation with the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive,39 transition periods and 
minimum harmonisation for VAT,40 and possibly minimum harmonisation or enhanced 
cooperation for the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).41 As will be 
explained in the following sections of this article, the necessity created by digitalisation of the 
economy42 and a purported desire to make corporation tax ‘fairer’,43 means that the Digital 
Services Tax (DST)44 is the interim proposal to permanent restructuring including the 
CCCTB.45 Therefore, if the CCCTB is likely to use differentiated integration the DST may 
also.46 Digitalisation may increase the need for differentiated integration in future in the area 
of taxation. In answering the research question, this article will demonstrate that there is a limit 
to how far harmonisation should go in the EU, and that in future-mapping developments in EU 
law, more differentiated integration will be used. Tax, as a microcosm, shows this to be the 
case.  
 
2. Future-mapping Differentiated Integration: The Tax Microcosm 
 
A combination of globalisation47 and the increasing emergence of the digital economy has 
prompted the EU to advertise a harmonisation agenda in the field of tax,48 with the desire of 
the EU to increase its own resources, especially prominent in the context of Covid-19,49 being 
an additional motivation. This agenda includes integration in the area of VAT, not yet fully 
achieved despite several decades in attempting to do so,50 integration in the area of corporate 
 
39 Council Directive 2016/1164/EU of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market [2016] OJ L 193/1 and P. Pistone (n2). 
40 On which see analysis in the next section of this article. 
41 Commission ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)’ 
COM (2016) 683 final, Commission ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base 
(CCTB)’ COM (2016) 685 final (hereinafter “CCCTB”) and A. Cedell (n38) p37. 
42 Y. Brauner and P. Pistone, “Adapting Current International Taxation to New Business Models: Two 
Proposals for the European Union,” 71(12) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2017); G. Kofler, G. Mayr, and C. Schlager, 
“Taxation of the Digital Economy: ‘Quick Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?” 57(12) Eur. Taxation (2017); 
Kofler, Mayr, and Schlager, “Taxation of the Digital Economy: A Pragmatic Approach to Short-Term 
Measures,” 58(4) Eur. Tax’n (2018); and Wolfgang Schön, “Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the 
Digitalized Economy,”72(4/5) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2018). 
43 V. Argyropoulou, ‘Digital Tax, Making Enterprises Pay their ‘Fair’ Share’, TILEC Discussion Paper No. DP 
2019-007. 
44 Commission ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax on revenues 
resulting from the provision of certain digital services’ COM (2018) 148 final (hereinafter “DST Proposal”). 
45 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Time to establish a 
modern, fair and efficient taxation standard for the digital economy’ COM (2018) 146 final, and European 
Commission, ‘Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy’ legislative proposals, 21 March 2018  
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/fair-taxation-digital-economy_en accessed 16 June 
2020. 
46 A. Cedelle suggests it is “unavoidable” (n38) p37 and see also M. Lang ‘The Principle of Territoriality and its 
Implications in the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB)’, WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2012-09, p3. 
47 On which see E. Fahey, The Global Reach of EU Law (Routledge 2016) and A. Bradford, The Brussels 
Effect: how the European Union rules the World (OUP 2020). 
48 See Communications from the Commission (n34) and (n45).  
49 S. Stolton, ‘Commission mulls digital tax to fund Europe’s multi-billion euro recovery’ (Euractiv 27 May 
2020) https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/commission-mulls-digital-tax-to-fund-europes-multi-
billion-euro-recovery/ accessed 16 June 2020 and O. Stefan’s article in this special issue. 
50 The lack of harmonisation has been recognised in the CJEU by Advocate General Sharpston, who stated that 
the ‘somewhat cloudy legislative environment characterised by tension between a drive towards fiscal 
harmonisation at EU level and a desire of individual Member States for individual fiscal control’ has resulted in 
this situation, C-434/05 Horizon College [2007] ECR I-04793, Opinion of AG Sharpston, paragraph 35. 
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tax, anti-tax avoidance, information sharing, and as an interim solution, a digital services tax.51 
The EU’s digital strategy with regard to VAT, aims to use the impetus of the digital economy 
to adapt to a ‘definitive’ system52 which, as will be discussed in more detail below, it has so 
far failed to achieve.53 The DST overlaps with the EU’s plans for reform of corporation tax, 
which includes proposals for a CCCTB.54  
 
I. The Harmonisation Agenda 
 
The DST has been described by the Commission as an ‘interim’ less preferred option to a 
comprehensive policy, which would see harmonisation of EU law on the subject of digital 
permanent establishments and profit allocation rules being incorporated into its proposals on 
the CCCTB.55 The proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax base envisions 
harmonisation to the corporate tax base only, not corporate tax rates, including a facility to opt-
in.56 According to Lang, it is a relatively broad and ambitious proposal,57 which has so far 
failed to be implemented in the EU, with many Member States opposed. It is because of the 
difficulty in achieving harmonisation of corporate tax on a broad scale, that use of differentiated 
integration has been considered,58 and an interim digital services tax suggested. 
 
The DST is proposed on the legal basis of Article 113 TFEU, which provides for the 
harmonisation of indirect taxation to the extent necessary to ensure the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market and the avoidance of distortion of competition. The 
Commission, in its Impact Assessment, states that the choice of Article 113 TFEU is justified 
as “ensuring that an immediate and harmonised response at EU level is provided to some of 
the identified problems [identified essentially as inadequate tax rules for the digital economy]. 
Additional fragmentation and distortions of competition could arise if unilateral actions were 
implemented by Member States before a comprehensive solution can be agreed. This requires 
the creation of a harmonised legislative framework within the EU concerning a new tax on 
digital activities. Given its (preferred) features, this tax would have more elements of an 
indirect tax, so it would need to be treated as an indirect tax other than turnover taxes and excise 
 
51 See Commission documents at (n34), (n44) and (n45) as well as Commission ‘Proposal for a Council 
Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence’ COM (2018) 147 
final, Commission Recommendation of 21 March 2018 relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital 
presence, COM (2018) 1650 final and Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, ‘Time to establish a modern, fair and efficient taxation standard for the digital economy’ COM 
(2018) 146 final. 
52 European Commission Press Release, ‘Towards a new and definitive VAT system for the EU, Brussels, 4 
October 2017 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/towards-new-and-definitive-vat-system-eu-2017-oct-04_en 
accessed 16 June 2020. 
53 See, amongst others, A. J. Easson, ‘The Elinimation of Fiscal Frontiers’, in R. Bieber et al (eds), One 
European Market? A Critical Analysis of the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy, (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988) 241-260, at 260. 
54 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment, Accompanying the document: Proposal for a 
Council Directive laying down rules relating to the corporate taxation of a significant digital presence 
{COM(2018) 147 final}; and Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital services tax 
on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services {COM(2018) 148 final} {SWD(2018) 82 
final} Brussels, 21.3.2018 SWD(2018) 81 final/2 (hereinafter “Impact Assessment”). See also CCCTB (n41). 
55 Impact Assessment (n54), see also (n45). 
56 M. Lang, (n46) p3. 
57 M. Lang, (n46). 
58 M. Lang, (n46). 
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duties”.59 There is debate60 over whether the DST is a consumption tax, rather like VAT, or a 
turnover tax, contrary to the Commission’s explanation61 or whether it fills gaps in VAT.62 
Whilst this raises issues of competence to harmonise with the DST itself, this will be discussed 
further in the next section. It suffices for present purposes to consider the DST in the context 
of being the lesser preferred interim option.  
 
In contrast to the DST, the legal basis for the comprehensive solution is Article 115 TFEU, 
which provides for approximation (harmonisation) of such laws of the Member States as 
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market. Whilst this, like Article 
113 TFEU, depends on unanimity in the Council and the special legislative procedure for its 
enactment, one can question whether it is sufficient in terms of EU competence to provide the 
legal basis for the Commission’s aims of “introducing a comprehensive and modern framework 
for the taxation of the digital economy to address structurally the root-cause of the issue [of 
digitalisation]”63 in a way which would “change the way the taxable nexus is established and 
profit is allocated to the taxable nexus. This approach could also be integrated into the CCCTB 
to provide for a comprehensive reform of the corporate income tax system…”.64 It is the extent 
of this proposed resolution to the issue of the digitalisation of the economy, especially as the 
Commission makes it clear in its impact assessment that the proposed CCTB / CCCTB would 
be in addition to specific digitalisation focused EU law,65 that is causing the issues with 
achieving harmonisation. The Commission does not stop there, as there are other potential 
options for proposals that reach even further, including a unitary corporate tax with potential 
convergence with international models, specifically anticipating action via the OECD.66 It is 
anticipated that in order to achieve what the Commission describes as global ‘alignment’ the 
proposals would anticipate an “approach [which] should be quite broad and flexible, while still 
providing Member States with a solid base to tax digital activity”.67 
 
What is problematic is that not a lot of explanation is given as to why the proposed level of 
integration, especially as to the comprehensive solution, should be enacted on these legal 
bases.68 The stated reason relates more generally to why taxation needs to adapt to modern 
developments of digitalisation, rather than specifically as to why the extent of EU integration 
being proposed is the best solution. To answer the research question posed by this article, 
integration is not limitless. Rather, it is, and quite rightly so in accordance with the Treaties, 
dependent on the extent of conferred EU competence. This is why the choice of legal basis is 
important. Indeed, as Eckes observes, “[w]ithin the European Union, the choice of legal basis 
has constitutional significance. It is the manifestation of an omnipresent political struggle of 
who is in charge. … The choice of legal basis is highly relevant within the EU legal order 
 
59 Impact Assessment (n54) p20. 
60 See Y. R. Kim, ‘Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation of the Consumption Tax Debate’, University 
of Utah College of Law Research Paper No. 371 (2020) and V. Argyropoulou (n43). 
61 Daniel Bunn, ‘A Summary of Criticisms of the EU Digital Tax’ Tax Foundation, 2018, p2. 
62 B. R. Zegarra, ‘The Interactions Between VAT and the Digital Services Tax Regime in Market Jurisdictions: 
Is the DST Filling the Gap Regarding the Taxation of the Digital Economy?’ 60 European Taxation 7 (2020) 
IBFD Journals section 1 and I. Roxan, ‘Is VAT Also a Corporate Tax? Untangling Tax Burdens and Benefits 
for Companies’ LSE Legal Studies Working Paper 2/2020 (16 March 2020). 
63 Impact Assessment (n54) p20. 
64 Impact Assessment (n54) p20. 
65 See generally Impact Assessment (n54). 
66 See generally Impact Assessment (n54). 
67 Impact Assessment (n54) p43. 
68 See, Michael P. Devereux and John Vella, ‘Taxing the Digitalised Economy: Targeted or System-Wide 
Reform?’ British Tax Review Issue 4 (2018) 387  
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because the Union may only act within the competence conferred to it.”69 Taxation, 
demonstrates some dubious choices as to the legal basis on which to develop EU law and 
integration, particularly in the field of corporate tax, which should arguably be an express 
competence in itself rather than relying on general internal market justifications in the legal 
bases selected. Whilst it is true that development of the internal market has been an impetus 
historically, the current proposals extend far beyond this. Therefore, in answering the research 
question, the tax microcosm shows that generally worded legal basis relating to harmonisation 
connected with the internal market should not be used to provide the legal basis to extend EU 
law into a new field and attempt to harmonise it.  
 
The difficulty in trying to achieve harmonisation, especially to the extent proposed, means that 
differentiated integration, which is a feature of the Union’s constitutionalized structure70 is 
much more realistically, and arguably more legitimately, achievable. Transition periods and 
minimum harmonisation, being legal forms of differentiated integration, have been the 
response to the difficulty in achieving integration, sometimes combined with information 
sharing. ‘Minimum’ harmonisation measures set a floor above which Member States are free 
to differentiate, usually by applying stricter or more far-reaching standards.71 In essence, 
Member States retain the competence to either keep the more stringent measures they already 
have in place, or adopt new measures. VAT, is held up as the paradigmatic example of the 
process of harmonisation of tax law in the EU, but has seen the use of both differentiation 
mechanisms. The Commission, by its own admission, does not consider the EU VAT system 
to be definitive and totally harmonised.72 Even in the follow up to the Action Plan on VAT, the 
Commission states that the VAT system in the EU has been based on the transitional 
arrangements form of differentiation, “[t]oday, the EU VAT system is too fragmented and too 
prone to fraud. As part of its agenda for a fair and efficient tax system in the EU, the 
Commission aims at rebooting the VAT system to ensure it remains an asset for the future.”73 
 
The historical emergence of VAT, including differentiation, began in the 1960s, with the 
Newmark Committee’s report recommending the harmonisation of sales taxes into VAT.74 The 
European Commission responded to the report by producing a draft Directive75 for partial 
harmonisation. Essentially, the European Commission was proposing a common form of tax 
for business-to-business transactions only, to be introduced in several stages over a number of 
 
69 C. Eckes, ‘EU Powers Under External Pressure: How the EU’s External Actions Alter its Internal Structures’ 
Oxford studies in European Law (Oxford University Press 2019) p113 and Article 5 (2) TEU. 
70 S. Weatherill, ‘Cases and Materials on EU Law’ 12th edn (OUP 2016)  p573. 
71 E. Vos, ‘Differentiation, Harmonization and Governance’ in B. De Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos, The Many 
Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Intersentia 2001) 148. 
72 See Commission ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee: On the follow-up to the Action Plan on VAT, Towards a single EU 
VAT area -Time to act’ COM (2017) 566 final, (hereinafter “VAT Action Plan follow-up”). 
73 VAT Action Plan follow-up (n72) at 3. See also Commission ‘Action Plan on VAT Towards a single EU 
VAT area – Time to decide’ COM (2016) 148 final. From the initial Action Plan, outlined in April 2016, the 
Commission made several proposals for implementation, including: ‘Proposal for a Council Directive  
amending Directive 2006/112/EC and Directive 2009/132/EC as regards certain value added tax obligations for  
supplies of  services and distance sales of goods’ (COM(2016) 757 final; ‘Proposal for a Council Implementing  
Regulation amending Implementing Regulation 282/2011/EU laying down implementing measures for 
Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax’ COM (2016) 756; ‘Proposal  for a Council 
Regulation amending Regulation 904/2010/EU on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field 
of value added tax’ COM (2016) 755; and ‘Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC 
as regards rates of value added tax applied to books, newspapers and periodicals’ COM (2016) 758.  
74 Neumark Report ‘Report of the Fiscal and Financial Committee on Tax Harmonization in the Common 
Market’ Report 21, Document SD-32 (EEC Commission, 1962). 
75 [1964] OJ 2512. 
 9 
years. This proved to be too hesitant an approach, and the European Commission produced 
more comprehensive proposals in 1965,76 which were adopted in early 1967, and became the 
First and Second VAT Directives.77  
 
The First VAT Directive was fundamental to the VAT system, because it contained the 
principles on the basis of which the system was ultimately designed.78 The Recitals to the First 
VAT Directive stated, and Articles 2 and 5 of that Directive enacted,79 what could be 
considered a mechanism of differentiated integration in the form of a transitional arrangement 
or, with hindsight, a form of the minimum harmonisation mechanism. It provided that:  
 
Whereas, however, the application of that tax to retail trade might in some Member 
States meet with practical and political difficulties; whereas, therefore, Member States 
should be permitted, subject to prior consultation, to apply the commom [sic] system 
only up to and including the wholesale trade stage, and to ap- ply[sic], as appropriate, 
a separate complementary tax at the retail trade stage, or at the preceding stage; 
 
Whereas it is necessary to proceed by stages, since the harmonisation of turnover taxes 
will lead in Member States to substantial alterations in tax structure and will have 
appreciable consequences in the budgetary, economic and social fields.80  
 
Although the purpose of the Second VAT Directive,81 was to set out more of the necessary 
details, it only addressed some of the issues which would require resolution in order to establish 
a truly common form of VAT. It allowed Member States to retain significant derogations from 
a Community wide version of VAT. The main differences between the Member States which 
the Second VAT Directive maintained, related to the tax base. The Member States retained the 
discretion to decide which goods and services were going to be subject to the tax and which 
were to going to be exempted from it.82 Furthermore, the Directive stated, at Article 10(3), that 
“Each Member State may, subject to the consultations mentioned in Article 16, determine the 
other exemptions which it considers necessary”.83 According to Williams, there was 
consequently a ‘fundamental deficiency’ in the 1967 framework.84 Article 13 of the Second 
VAT Directive also provided for derogations, and Article 17 was a fine example of the 
transitional provision mechanism of differentiated integration. The Annexes to the Second 
VAT Directive also provided for exemptions to the tax base. Other national differences which 
were maintained related to identifying who should be subject to VAT, and how VAT was to 
be applied to both imported goods and cross-border supplies of services.85 Differentiation 
applied to the tax rates as well as the tax base. 
 
 
76 [1966] OJ 561. Also see D. Williams, EC Tax Law (European Law Series, Longman 1998) 80-1. 
77 First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States 
concerning turnover taxes [1967] OJ 1301/67, Spec Ed 14, (hereinafter “First Directive”) and Second Council 
Directive 67/228/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning 
turnover taxes Structure and procedures for application of the common system of value added tax [1967] OJ 
1303/67 Spec Ed 16 (hereinafter “Second Directive”).  
78 Recitals and first two Articles, First Directive (n77). 
79 First Directive (n77). 
80 First Directive (n77). 
81 Second Directive (n77). 
82 D. Williams, (n76) 82. 
83 Article 10 (3) Second Directive (n77). 
84 D. Williams (n76) 82. 
85 D. Williams (n76) 82. 
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However, the pressure for harmonisation of the VAT tax base came not from concerns about 
competition distortions, but from the then Community’s need to find itself an income and the 
subsequent 1970 Decision introducing the Community’s Own Resources.86 In light of this 
imperative to raise funds, the Community viewed the maintenance of so many exceptions as 
unsustainable. Change needed to occur. The Sixth VAT Directive87 was the instrument chosen 
by the then Community to effect such change. However, Williams considers that this ‘still fell 
far short of being the same tax in each state’,88 because important Member State derogations 
remained.89 Although the Community had succeeded in providing itself with an income, the 
system was not exactly one of total harmonisation. In fact, many of the terms depended on 
national law for their definition, ‘taxable person’ being one such example, and the narrow 
patchwork tax base continued, providing the Member States with the ability to introduce other 
taxes, such as stamp duties, for example.  
 
Other Directives followed and so between 1992 and 2006, the European Commission made 
several efforts to rationalise the VAT Directives, including attempts to harmonise VAT rates90 
and abolish the Member State-specific derogations.91 However, the Member States could not 
agree on any of these proposals, and they were subsequently abandoned. As a result, the rate 
variations and derogations of the 1992 VAT Directive were maintained, mostly unchanged, in 
the current Principal VAT Directive.92 In 2011, after nearly twenty years of failed efforts to 
further harmonise VAT rates and abolish these country-specific exemptions, the European 
Commission and the Member States concluded that the transitional approach should instead 
become the “definitive” system.93 History demonstrates the EU’s difficulties in its attempts to 
harmonise VAT. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that when the Commission issued 
new proposals entitled, ‘Towards a single EU VAT area’,94 it stated that ‘The current VAT 
system dates from 1993 and was intended to be a transitional system. It is fragmented and 
overly complex for the growing number of businesses operating cross-border … domestic and 
cross-border transactions are treated differently and goods or services can be bought free of 
VAT within the Single Market’.95 VAT is an example of where an historical assessment of the 
process of harmonisation in tax demonstrates that there is more differentiation than one might 
think, essentially due to the difficulty of achieving unanimous agreement between all the 
Member States.  
 
 
 
86 Council Decision 70/243/ECSC/EEC/Euratom of 21 April 1970 on the Replacement of Financial 
Contributions from Member States by the Communities’ Own Resources [1970] OJ L 94/19 Spec Ed 224. 
87 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment [1977] OJ L 145/1 
(hereinafter “Sixth Directive”). 
88 D. Williams (n76) 82-3. 
89 Article 20 of the Sixth Directive (n87). 
90 [COM (1996) 328]; 
91 [COM(2003) 397 final]. See also on the lack of total harmonisation in relation to VAT and the Commission’s 
efforts to resolve this, R. de la Feria, ‘VAT and the EC Internal market: The Shortcomings of Harmonisation’ in 
D. Weber (ed.), Traditional and Alternative Routes to European Tax Integration (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2010), 
267-308 and Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper, WP09/29. 
92 EU Principal VAT Directive (Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system 
of values added tax [2006] OJ L 347/1 as amended. 
93 Rita de la Feria, ‘The Definitive VAT System: Breaking with Transition’ 27 (3) (2018) EC Tax Review 122, 
at 122. 
94 See the legislation detailed at (n72) and (n73). 
95 European Commission Press Release ‘European Commission proposes far-reaching reform of the EU VAT 
system’ (Brussels, 4 October 2017). 
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II. The Digitalisation Imperative 
 
Considering the past, present and future of tax harmonisation, it is pertinent to analyse the 
current state of play with VAT. The EU is trying to achieve harmonisation in the context of  its 
attempts to achieve a digital single market.96 The Commission has therefore produced 
proposals, commencing with its 2016 VAT Action Plan,97 to introduce provisions for the 
implementation of the legal ‘cornerstones’,98 that aim to achieve a definitive VAT system by 
2022, introducing reforms in a piecemeal fashion, some applying from 1 January 2019 and 
others due to come into effect from 1 January 2021.99 The success of the current proposals,100 
and their influence upon future-mapping the development of EU law, depends on whether the 
EU’s integrative methods are successful, as de la Feria suggests, “[l]ike with previous 
initiatives regarding the EU VAT system, success is largely dependent on the Commission’s 
ability—or inability—to harness critical economic and political moments in EU history for real 
reform. At present it seems that the digitalisation of the economy may succeed where others 
have failed”.101  
 
The digital imperative is leading to a shift in focus of VAT to a destination, rather than an 
origin, based tax. The failure to achieve a definitive VAT system based on the ‘origin’ principle 
of taxation of cross-border supplies of goods in the Member States of their origin, is ‘one of 
the most important and obvious’ failures of the harmonisation attempts in the field of VAT, 
according to Owsiany-Hornung.102 As this article attempts to map the future development of 
EU law, we again see that differentiation is needed with regard to the destination principle, as 
in respect of both VAT rates103 and the VAT base, there is still a lack of harmonisation in the 
new proposals, which de la Feria suggests leaves VAT in a state of ‘disharmonisation’, “they 
are based on the wrong assumption, namely that full destination-based taxation removes the 
need for harmonisation of the base. It is true that taxation at destination is likely to remove the 
incentives to re-location; but wrong to infer that these incentives are the only reason for 
 
96 European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the EESC and the Committee of Regions, COM (2015) 192 final, 6 
May 2015. See also, Florian S. Zawodsky ‘Value Added Taxation in the Digital Economy’ British Tax Review 
Issue 5 (2018) 606. 
97 See the legislation detailed at (n72) and (n73). 
98 European Commission Press Release (n95). 
99 See the legislation detailed at (n72) and (n73) and: European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive 
amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards harmonising and simplifying certain rules in the value added tax 
system and introducing the definitive system for the taxation of trade between Member States, COM(2017) 569 
final, 4 October 2017; Council Directive (EU) 2017/2455 of 5 December 2017 amending Directive 
2006/112/EC and Directive 2009/132/EC as regards certain value added tax obligations for supplies of services 
and distance sales of goods, OJ L 348, 29.12.2017, p. 7- 22; Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2459 
of 5 December 2017 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 laying down implementing 
measures for Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax, OJ L 348, 29.12.2017, p. 32–
33; and Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2454 of 5 December 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 on 
administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax, OJ L 348, 29.12.2017, p. 1-6. 
100 See the legislation detailed at (n72), (n73), (n99) and Commission ‘Towards a single EU VAT area - Time to 
act - Amended proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 as regards measures 
to strengthen administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax COM (2017) 706 final. For a further 
account see I. Lejeune and C. A. Herbain, ‘Recent developments on EU VAT: VAT Digital Single Market 
package, British Tax Review Issue 1 (2018) and Rita de la Feria (n93). 
101 Rita de la Feria (n93) at 127. 
102 M. Owsiany-Hornung, ‘Infringement Procedure as a Tool for VAT Harmonisation’ in M. Lang, P. Pistone, 
A. Rust, J. Schuch, C. Staringer, and D. Raponi, (eds), CJEU – Recent Developments in Value Added Tax 2016 
(Linde 2017) 16. 
103 On which see I. Lejeune and C. A. Herbain A revamped flexibility on VAT rates for Member States British 
Tax Review Issue 2 (2018) 161. 
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harmonising VAT rates, and thus that their removal somehow legitimises disharmonisation. 
As the Commission implicitly acknowledges, the proposed disharmonisation is expected to 
increase the levels of both rates discrepancy – across Member States –, and rates differentiation 
– across products – but as opposed to what it argues, these increases can have far reaching 
effects … It is therefore difficult to see how this proposal can in any way improve the 
functioning of the Internal Market or remove distortions to competition, as required by Article 
113 TFEU. To use that Article as a legal basis for the proposal seems, therefore, to be in strict 
contravention of the EU principle of conferral of powers.”104 
 
The research question which this article seeks to try and answer, is how far should 
harmonisation go in the EU? If tax is generally thought of as a Member State competence, as 
illustrated by the limited options for legal bases for the reforms, then the answer should be not 
very far, and/or there should be increased differentiation. In light of the imperative of 
digitalisation, as de la Feria forcefully illustrates, differentiation seems to have been 
deliberately adopted. Treating tax as a microcosm and applying the analytic generalisation 
aspect of the case study methodology, it is then possible to future map the development of EU 
law by suggesting that use of differentiated integration will increase.  
 
The DST reinforces this conclusion. In its Communication to the European Parliament and 
Council on ‘A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the Digital Single 
Market’,105 the Commission declared the establishment of the digital single market as one of 
its ten political priorities. This was in 2017.106 Since then, the DST,107 explained previously as 
an interim measure forming part of the harmonising agenda in taxation, has so far failed to be 
adopted, following a negative vote in the Council in March 2019.108 This is even on a proposal 
of limited scope, which had reduced the DST to a sales tax on digital advertising services.109 
The previous, comparatively extensive, proposal was for a uniform tax rate of 3%110 on 
revenues generated by selling online advertising space, from digital intermediary activities 
between users for facilitating the sale of goods and services, and from the sale of data generated 
from the user-provider information.111 It would have applied only to companies with total 
worldwide revenues above 750 million Euros and EU revenues of 50 million Euros.112  
 
The reasoning behind attempting to adopt an EU wide DST, in the absence of an international 
DST achieved through the OECD, is to obtain harmonised application of such taxation so as 
to, according to the stated objective of the proposal,113 protect the integrity of the single market 
and to avoid the fragmentation which would occur if the Member States adopted their own 
DSTs on an individual basis.114 Seemingly contrary to this intention, is the Joint Declaration 
 
104 Rita de la Feria (n93) at 127-8. 
105 Commission Communication (n34). 
106 Commission Communication (n34). 
107 See Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Directive on the common system of a digital 
services tax on revenues resulting from the provision of certain digital services – General approach, Doc. No. 
14886/18 FISC 511 ECOFIN 1149 DIGIT 239, 29 November 2018. 
108 Outcome of Council Meeting 7368/19, 6 (March 12, 2019) 
109 European Parliament Briefing, ‘Interim digital services tax on revenues from certain digital services, 
December 2018. 
110 DST proposal (n44) Article 8. 
111 DST Proposal (n44) Article 3. 
112 DST Proposal (n44) Article 4 
113 DST proposal (n44) Preamble, p3 
114 M. Lamensch, Digital Services Tax: A Critical Analysis and Comparison with the VAT System, 59 
European Taxation 6 (2019) section 2.1, Journals IBFD published online 17 May 2019. 
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submitted by France and Germany at the 4 December 2018 ECOFIN Council meeting,115 which 
urged the adoption of a DST on the more limited tax base described as ‘referring to 
advertisement’,116 but stated that a Directive enacted on this basis ‘would not prevent Member 
States from introducing in their domestic legislation a digital tax on a broader base’,117 which 
France, among other Member States, has subsequently done.118 The first, most obvious 
observation, is that such a limited approach may seem a contradiction to the stated objective of 
protecting the integrity of the single market. This observation is however crucial when 
considering the legal basis for this proposal is Article 113 TFEU, which permits EU legislative 
integrative action to the extent that it is necessary to ensure the establishment and the 
functioning of the internal market. In essence, if the eventual DST, should it actually be adopted 
along the lines of the French – German proposal, permits or even encourages fragmentation 
then it is questionable – in addition to the issue as to whether the DST is in fact an indirect 
tax119 - whether this is an appropriate legal basis,120 as the tax seems to aim at achieving a 
fragmentation contrary to the justification for EU action contained in the Treaty Article itself. 
However, this is another instance where tax can be seen as a microcosm of the issues 
surrounding differentiated integration. What one could argue is proposed by France and 
Germany is a Directive which could become a minimum harmonisation measure, providing for 
a DST and setting the rate at 3% with the same revenue thresholds, but limiting the tax base to 
advertisements, thereby allowing Member States to differentiate outside of this. As minimum 
harmonisation is a recognised form of differentiated integration121 permitted by the Treaty, 
maintaining differing systems in a sensitive area of Member State sovereignty can help provide 
a solution. Differentiated integration can be a solution in the case study of tax and therefore 
can be analytically generalised to answer the wider question of how far should integration go 
in the EU. The future development of EU law is an increased use of and reliance on 
differentiated integration. 
 
It is pertinent to reiterate, as discussed earlier in this article, that the DST was not the 
Commission’s most desirable option for addressing the digitalisation of the economy. On the 
contrary, the DST has been described by the Commission as an ‘interim’ less preferred option 
to a comprehensive policy, which would see harmonisation of EU law on the subject of digital 
permanent establishments and profit allocation rules being incorporated into its proposals on 
the CCCTB.122 This solution was preferred, in part to prevent what has subsequently happened, 
which is some Member States, and the UK as well, implementing their own versions of a DST, 
although at varying tax rates and varying qualifying revenue thresholds.123 The alternative for 
 
115 The text of the Declaration entitled ‘Franco-German joint  declaration  on  the  taxation  of  digital  
companies  and minimum taxation’ is available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37276/fr-de-joint-
declaration-on-the-taxation-of-digital-companies-final.pdf accessed July 2020. 
116 Joint Declaration, (n115). 
117 Joint Declaration, (n115). 
118 See M. Szczepanski, ‘Digital Taxation: State of Play and Way Forward’ European Parliamentary Research 
Service Blog, 19 March 2020 https://epthinktank.eu/2020/03/19/digital-taxation-state-of-play-and-way-forward/ 
accessed 15 July 2020. 
119 On which see M. Lamensch (n114). 
120 J. Backer and J. Englisch, ‘EU Digital services Tax: A Populist and Flawed Proposal’ Kluwer International 
Tax Blog, 16 March 2018 http://kluwertaxblog.com/2018/03/16/eu-digital-services-tax-populist-flawed-
proposal/?doing_wp_cron=1594366177.2683420181274414062500  accessed 11 July 2020. 
121 Vos (n26). 
122 Impact Assessment (n54). 
123 HM Revenue and Customs Digital Services Tax policy paper, 11 March 2020 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introduction-of-the-digital-services-tax/digital-services-tax 
accessed 17 June 2020 and Elke Asen, ‘Digital Tax Update: Digital Services Taxes in Europe’ Tax Foundation, 
16 March 2020, https://taxfoundation.org/digital-tax-europe-2020/ accessed 17 June 2020. 
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the EU is to attempt to influence124 and achieve agreement to global initiatives by the end of 
2020, failing which it is back to the drawing board to attempt an EU wide solution yet again. 
 
That the so far failed attempts to introduce the DST were as a result of the current unsuccessful 
attempts to introduce the ‘comprehensive’ solution to the digitalisation of the economy, which 
would have incorporated some harmonisation to taxation in the corporate sphere, speaks 
volumes for the future-mapping of differentiated integration. The fact that the EU’s 
harmonising and integrative attempt has so far failed to introduce, not just this comprehensive 
proposal, but also a reduced form of the lesser preferred interim solution, does seemingly cast 
aspersions on the prospects of achieving total harmonisation in the future. Again, there will be 
a greater need for differentiation in future. Analytic generalisation provided through the case 
study methodology informs this mapped future. As this article has demonstrated, tax is a 
microcosm, from which it is possible to analytically generalise, suggesting that there are other 
areas of EU law which may find their future development in the direction of harmonisation 
equally difficult to achieve, and therefore differentiated integration should feature more 
significantly in the future than it has in the past. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In answering the research question, how far should integration go in the EU?, there are lessons 
to be learned from history and the application of the case study methodology, particularly 
analytic generalisation. This article has demonstrated that there are limits to harmonisation and 
in actual fact it appears that the more the EU tries to harmonise the more it requires the use of 
the mechanisms of differentiated integration. The lesson that can potentially be learnt from the 
tax microcosm, is that differentiated integration will need to be utilised more in the future. This 
is especially so, if the EU attempts to integrate through legislative harmonisation in areas which 
impact on Member State sovereignty.  
 
 
124 On which see A. Bradford, (n47). 
